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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine 
the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a 
common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. 
After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged 
in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic 
selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing 
the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of 
such an argument. 
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In this paper, I highlight a tension between a common methodology in philosophical 
inquiry and some construals of the doctrine of the Fall. I then present an argument from 
an extreme interpretation of the doctrine of the Fall to the conclusion that no human 
person ought to trust their cognitive faculties.1 After setting up this argument, I 
demonstrate that even in this worst-case scenario of the implications of the doctrine of 
the Fall for our reliability as cognitive agents—namely, that we are woefully unreliable 
when it comes to grasping truth2—human agents do not have good reason to distrust 
their epistemic selves. That is, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine 
the propriety of epistemic self-trust or trusting one’s epistemic intuitions.3 
                                                          
1 It’s possible for us to limit the interpretation of the Fall to only affect knowledge (cf. Owen 1965 248); 
referenced in McMartin (2016, 354), as opposed to other epistemic goods such as rationality or practical 
wisdom, or only our grasp of godly things rather than practical affairs (cf. Gerrish 1962 12); also quoted in 
McMartin 2016, 354). However, for the sake of my argument, the more extreme views are of the greatest 
interest. 
2 And lest we think such a claim entirely lacks any scriptural support, consider Ephesians 4:17-18 
(NRSV): “Now this I affirm and insist on in the Lord: you must no longer live as the Gentiles live, in the 
futility of their minds. They are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of 
their ignorance and hardness of heart.” See also much of Romans 1, Ephesians 2, 2 Corinthians 4:3-4, the 
constant gospel (and prophetic) theme that many people lack ears to hear and eyes to see (e.g. Isaiah 6). 
3 Notice that this thesis is consistent with the view that we should not trust our epistemic intuitions for 
some other reason. It’s just that no reason for doubting our reliability can be gained from reflections on the 
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Such an argument is needed, especially in light of the hope for increased dialogue 
between the disciplines of scriptural scholarship, theology, and analytic philosophy. It is 
commonplace, for instance, for these various practitioners to present moral intuitions in 
support of rejecting certain readings of a passage of scripture (e.g. genocide passages 
found in the Hebrew Scriptures). Yet often, when presenting such intuitions, 
theologians and philosophers are confronted with a doctrine of the Fall as an 
insurmountable objection to trusting their intuitions in a particular case.4 Indeed, they 
might be accused of shaping God to fit the image of man by appealing to their moral 
intuitions over and against the plain reading of the scriptural text.5 My point in this 
paper is that even if the objector is right to think that our cognitive capacities are 
completely destroyed by the Fall, they are wrong to think that calls our moral intuitions 
into question for us thereby undermining the relevance of those intuitions to our 
assessments of scripture. In other words, it will not follow that it is wrong, epistemically 
speaking, to trust our moral intuitions in such cases. 
I proceed as follows. In §1 I present my preferred methodology for theological 
inquiry; namely, reflective equilibrium. My reason for so beginning is to provide a 
working model of a standard method of inquiry that is assumed as permissible within 
most academic settings but which, nevertheless, is susceptible to the central argument  
with which I shall be concerned. Then in §2 I present a worst-case scenario 
interpretation of the doctrine of the Fall founded upon the Genesis text and some of 
John Calvin’s reflections on the Fall in his Institutes of the Christian Religion. On the basis 
of this Calvin-inspired interpretation of the doctrine of the Fall, I then put together an 
argument concerning the reliability of post-lapsarian human cognition. The resulting 
argument, if it were successful, would undermine trusting one’s intuitions concerning 
any and all matters of inquiry, thus undercutting the common practice of reflective 
equilibrium, which assumes that trust in one’s cognitive faculties is rational. However, 
in the second half of §2 I demonstrate the self-undermining nature of any such 
argument. Thus, I conclude that epistemic self-trust and trusting one’s intuitions cannot 





                                                                                                                                                                                            
Fall and original sin. It is also consistent with an agent choosing to recalibrate the evidential weight they 
assign alternative interpretations of, say, scripture as opposed to their own intuitions in a given case. But 
the very act of recalibrating the evidential weightings involved presupposes epistemic self-trust. 
4 Indeed, this has happened to me on more than one occasion. 
5 I don’t assume that there is such a thing as “the plain reading of the scriptural text” for the purposes 
of this paper. Indeed, I think the argument here goes through without becoming encumbered by 
questions of divine inspiration of scripture or questions of inerrancy and infallibility. 
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1. On Reflective Equilibrium 
 
In philosophy, it is quite common to engage in a methodology known as reflective 
equilibrium.6 This method is most easily understood when one asks oneself what should 
be privileged, either one’s theories or the data (or intuitions) the theories are meant to 
explain, when engaged in a particular domain of inquiry. Let us use ethics as an 
illustration. 
Suppose you are trying to select an ethical theory according to which you will order 
your life, and suppose for simplicity’s sake that you are only considering utilitarianism7 
and Kantian deontology, with the second formulation of the categorical imperative as 
your primary guide (i.e., to always treat others as ends in themselves, and not merely as 
means).8 Further suppose that you consider whether it would be right to frame an 
innocent person for a crime that would eventuate in their death at your hands. And 
suppose further that this action would be guaranteed to set the minds of your populace 
at ease and prevent riots that would certainly result in at least 20 deaths of innocent 
persons were they to occur. The utilitarian theory, on the one hand, tells you that you 
should surely bring about this state of affairs on the assumption that it results in the 
greatest overall balance of good for the greatest number. Kantian deontology, on the 
other hand, would categorically rule out such an action since to murder an innocent 
person to achieve some end would surely be an instance of treating that person as a mere 
means and not also an end in themselves.  
But suppose now that after determining the deliverances of utilitarianism and 
Kantian deontology for this act you consult your own intuitions, i.e. your moral data, 
about the case. The idea of punishing an innocent person seems to you as always 
morally unjustified, even if it leads to exceedingly positive consequences. Thus, you find 
yourself with an intuition that conflicts with the truth of utilitarianism. What is the 
proper procedure from here? 
Well, reflective equilibrium is the process of modifying one’s intuitions and one’s 
theories in light of each other, such that one is able to arrive at some degree of coherence 
between them.9 In other words, reflective equilibrium is a permissive method of rational 
inquiry whereby two individuals might reasonably come to different conclusions about 
                                                          
6 ‘Reflective equilibrium’ can also refer to a state at which this method is aimed. The following article, 
in its introduction, draws explicit attention to this ambiguity of ‘reflective equilibrium’: (Daniels 2016). 
7 See John Stuart Mill (1979), and the now indispensable debate: Utilitarianism: For and against (Smart 
and Williams 1973). 
8 “The subject of ends (i.e. the rational being itself) must be made the basis of every maxim of action 
and thus be treated never as a mere means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means—
i.e. also as an end” (Immanuel Kant 2008, 35). 
9 A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999) is the work in which this method of reflective equilibrium was coined. 
It was originally published in 1971. 
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the same subject matter without one of them giving up their claim to rationality. For 
instance, person A might trust her intuitions regarding the moral wrongness of killing 
an innocent person more than she trusts Utilitarianism and thereby reasonably reject it 
in favor of a deontological approach to ethics. However, person B might, when faced 
with the same decision, find that she trusts Utilitarianism more than she trusts her 
ability to track the rightness or wrongness of particular acts, in which case, she might 
reasonably dismiss her intuition as misleading and endorse the utilitarian verdict. And 
according to the method of reflective equilibrium, both verdicts could be rational 
relative to the individual drawing each respective verdict. 
Now whether or not reflective equilibrium is a promising method of philosophical 
inquiry, it assumes something important about the nature of inquiry; namely, that 
inquiry requires an inquirer that can sort through the theories and the data. Moreover, 
the method assumes that there is nothing suspicious in assigning such a place of 
epistemic importance to human cognitive faculties and their deliverances. After all, it is 
the judgments of the inquirer concerning her intuitions and their relationship to the 
theories she considers that are decisive in determining which position(s) she ought to 
affirm. 
In pure philosophical inquiry, such a view need not be highly problematic. Yet, as 
soon as one admits of certain theological premises, grounds appear that threaten our 
confidence in the deliverances of human cognitive faculties. Indeed, the doctrine of the 
Fall has been historically interpreted by some theologians in such a way that it seriously 
threatens to undermine epistemic trust in oneself and others. Let us, then, turn to a 
discussion of the imago dei in Christian theology and the potential cognitive damage to 
which the imago dei is allegedly subject as a result of the Fall. 
 
2. Original Sin and Our Cognitive Capacities 
 
The creation of humanity in Genesis 1 affirms quite clearly that humanity is made in the 
image of God: 
 
“26 Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and 
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over 
the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that 
creeps upon the earth.” 
27 So God created humankind in his image,  
in the image of God he created them; 
male and female he created them.”10 
 
                                                          
10 Unless otherwise indicated, Biblical references will be to the NRSV. 
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What constitutes the image of God11, as it is understood in Genesis, has been fairly 
controversial historically. Some theologians claim that the image of God in humanity is 
constituted by certain capacities humans share with the divine12, capacities which are 
presumably lacked to some significant degree by other creatures (e.g. rationality, 
imagination, or an ability to lovingly respond to God13). Although it seems unlikely that 
such a view of the image of God quite reflects the original understanding of the Genesis 
text14; nevertheless, at least the potential for the possession of certain intellectual 
capacities is, in some important way, related to human possession or implementation of 
the image of God. 
Emphasizing human cognitive capacities as part (or necessary concomitants) of the 
image of God is especially important if we are to determine the extent to which we can 
trust those cognitive capacities in our post-lapsarian context. After all, in the biblical 
narrative, it is the image of God that is in some sense marred or effaced following the Fall 
caused by the primal human sin. Consider, then, the following enlightening passage 
from John Calvin: 
“Original sin…may be defined as the hereditary corruption and depravity of our 
nature. This reaches every part of the soul, makes us abhorrent to God’s wrath and 
produces in us what Scripture calls works of the flesh…Our nature is not only 
completely empty of goodness, but so full of every kind of wrong that it is always active. 
Those who call it lust use an apt word, provided it is also stated…that everything which 
is in man, from the intellect to the will, from the soul to the body, is defiled and imbued 
with this lust. To put it briefly, the whole man is in himself nothing but lust.”15 
                                                          
11 I thank Christa McKirland for her paper presentation, “The Image of God and Intersex Persons,” for 
the Logos Institute of Analytic and Exegetical Theology on October 13, 2016. The presentation of her research 
was extremely helpful for my thinking on this subject matter. See also (Crisp 2016, 51-70) i.e. chapter 4, 
“The Christological Doctrine of the Image of God”) for an excellent discussion of the issues. 
12 Proponents of such a view include: (i) Irenaeus, Against Heresies (2015); (ii) Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae Ia q. 93 a. 4 & 6; (iii) John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (1986), 1.15; (iv) The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church III.I.1, art. 1; and (v) J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human 
Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (2009).  
13 Here I have in mind Emil Brunner (1952, 55-61; 75-78). 
14 That understanding, I take it, would be much closer to understanding humans as representatives of 
God to creation. That is, humanity exercises dominion as deputized authorities over creation. For 
variations on this theme, see: (i) Plantinga, Thompson, Lundberg (2010, 182-5) ; (ii) Walton (2015, 190-197); 
and (iii) Wright (2008). 
15 Calvin, Institutes, 2.1.8, 90–1. As I admit in the text, Calvin is not altogether clear concerning his 
approach to the image of God post-Fall. On the one hand, in the passage quoted and in some other points 
of discussion concerning the post-lapsarian image of God, it seems that the image of God has been 
entirely effaced; that is, nothing good remains. In other places, Calvin offers a less pessimistic position 
that merely claims the image is severely damaged. I think the latter interpretation is preferable on 
grounds of interpretive charity. Nevertheless, I assume the extreme view above for the sake of developing 
a worst-case scenario for the purposes of argument. 




According to Calvin, all humanity has inherited a sort of disease known as original 
sin. As he describes this malady, every part of the soul, including both the intellect and 
will is ‘defiled’ and ‘completely empty of goodness’. This language concerning the 
problem of sin is strong indeed, and it might lead us to wonder whether or not an 
intellect that fits such a description is worthy of the high epistemic status attributed to it 
by those who engage in the method of reflective equilibrium. On such a view, it is claimed 
that we can consult our intuitions—i.e., the deliverances of our cognitive capacities—
and perhaps rely on them in determining what to believe about various domains of 
inquiry including ethical theory or even the nature of scriptural hermeneutics. But 
suppose that Calvin is right and that original sin has afflicted our intellects as to make 
them in fact unreliable. Not only unreliable, however, but completely empty of goodness, 
which includes epistemic goodness of all sorts. What would this imply about the 
epistemic propriety of trusting the deliverances of our cognitive faculties? 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, very little is implied. Or at least, very little is 
implied for anyone trying to reason through these puzzling questions from the 
inescapable first-person perspective (i.e. “the egocentric predicament”16) in which 
human agents find themselves. To understand why we should not be bothered by the 
potential implications of the doctrine of the Fall for our epistemic practices, consider the 
following bit of reasoning an agent might discern; that is, an agent who comes to believe 
that there is a real possibility that her cognitive faculties are unreliable due to the 
debilitating noetic effects of sin: 
 
“Sally has always trusted herself generally when it comes to her intellectual activities. 
That is, she has always considered herself generally (though not infallibly) trustworthy 
concerning the gathering of evidence and the evaluation of that evidence. However, 
upon reading John Calvin’s Institutes, she comes to believe that there is a real possibility 
that her intellectual activities are in some significant way unreliable due to the corruption 
of sin. As a result, she acquires a reason to doubt that her cognitive faculties are 
generally reliable. This is an unfortunate thing, for now Sally is unsure whether or not 
she can trust the particular deliverances of her intellectual activities in the future. And 
what’s worse, it seems that the reason Sally has for distrusting her intellectual self in 
general is a reason she only gains by way of an act of trusting those very cognitive 
capacities being called into question. That is, she gains a reason for ceasing to trust her 
epistemic self with an act of trusting her epistemic self. Puzzled about the implications 
for her cognitive life, Sally wonders how to move forward.”17 
 
                                                          
16 This label was coined by Richard Foley (1987). 
17 To engage in a discussion of the importance and justification of epistemic self-trust would take us too 
far afield in this paper. For those interested to learn more, see (i) Foley (2001) and (ii) Zagzebski (2012). 
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Perhaps this thought experiment seems a bit misleading as an interpretation of 
Calvin, but let us leave proper interpretation aside. For the interpretation I have 
suggested is a worst-case scenario understanding of the Fall, and if it can be shown that 
there is room for Sally to trust her epistemic faculties in a worst-case scenario, then it 
will plausibly follow that in any better-case scenario she again will be within her 
epistemic rights to trust her intellectual activities. So let us consider the implications of 
this thought process for Sally.18 
There are a couple of features of this situation that merit our attention. First, when 
Sally considers the noetic effects of sin, she acquires a reason to doubt her reliability as 
an epistemic agent. However, as a matter of practical necessity, she also begins her 
journey to this realization with a presumption of her epistemic reliability. In other 
words, Sally begins with a self-given and pre-reflective reason to think the she is a 
reliable epistemic agent. Thus, upon reading Calvin, Sally finds herself with both a 
reason to affirm and a reason to doubt her reliability as an epistemic agent; that is, there 
is a clash of reasons concerning her reliability, a clash which must be sorted out.  
But now, who will be doing the sorting? There is no other party to which Sally might 
turn to decide which reason, either the one for or the one against her reliability as an 
epistemic agent, bears the most weight. So obviously, it is Sally who must sort out the 
tension concerning whether to continue trusting her epistemic self, and she must do so 
egocentrically. But then let us draw out the possible ways of resolving Sally’s 
conundrum. 
First, Sally can decide to simply continue trusting the deliverances of her epistemic 
faculties. Now perhaps contrary to appearances, this continuation of trust need not be 
one of brazen disregard concerning the effects of sin. Sally has clearly been deeply 
troubled when reflecting on the reach of original sin after the Fall. However, after long 
and sober reflection, she may simply find that it just seems best to her that she continue to 
trust herself. Indeed, Sally may even recalibrate the degree of reliability she assigns to 
her cognitive faculties in hopes that she may adequately account for the presence of sin 
without giving up trust in her epistemic self on the whole.  
However, it is also possible for Sally to cease trusting her epistemic self, or at least, 
such a position seems possible in the abstract. But how might this go, exactly? Is there a 
clear path of reasoning that might coherently lead Sally to this conclusion? Perhaps it is 
possible for Sally to just adopt such a stance by fiat19, but suppose instead that she tries 
to reason her way to distrusting her cognitive faculties. The following argument seems 
to articulate well the line of reasoning Sally might have in mind: 
                                                          
18 I hope it’s obvious that Sally is meant to be representative of the epistemic conundrum facing anyone 
in similar circumstances. 
19 Although, it’s hard to imagine how we might truly call such a move rational. If one adopts an 
attitude of distrust towards oneself by fiat (i.e., without even considering a reason to adopt the attitude), 
the move seems non-rational at best. 




i. If Calvin’s understanding of original sin is correct, then my epistemic 
activities are not trustworthy. 
ii. Calvin’s understanding of original sin is correct. 
iii. My epistemic activities are not trustworthy. 
 
Now, consider whether this string of reasoning, which led Sally to a reason to doubt 
her rationality, can itself be rationally endorsed. On the one hand, if the answer is yes 
(i.e. that the line of reasoning can be endorsed by Sally), then the same line of reasoning 
will lead to two inconsistent propositions: (a) Sally is epistemically trustworthy, i.e. with 
respect to following the lines of this argument, and (b) Sally is not epistemically 
trustworthy. But of course, from this it follows that Sally both is and is not epistemically 
trustworthy, and no string of reasoning that leads to a contradiction is either 
trustworthy or rationally endorsable.  
Suppose instead that the answer is no (i.e. that the line of reasoning above cannot be 
endorsed by Sally). Well, if the reasoning itself cannot be reasonably endorsed, then 
why would Sally trust the conclusion to which the reasoning leads? Surely that would 
be foolhardy, for even if the conclusion were true, Sally could have no reason to believe 
it to be true! 
In summary then, the above argument can be clearly seen to be self-undermining. For 
if the conclusion is true, then no one can rationally endorse the argument, and if the 
conclusion is false, then no one should rationally endorse the argument. Thus, it seems 
that there is simply no road open to a rational endorsement of the above argument. And 
as a result, the best way forward for Sally is to continue trusting her epistemic self, even 




                                                          
20 The results here are similar to the results one might expect when dealing with the new evil demon 
problem: suppose that there are two possible worlds, w1 and w2, the first of which is the actual world in 
which all epistemic agents undergo experiences in normal ways (i.e. by seeing chairs and tasting ice cream, 
let’s say) and the second of which is an evil demon world (i.e. a world in which all experience is 
misleading, such that one never sees chairs or tastes ice cream, but rather, is simply given the illusion that 
one is doing so). Suppose the denizens of w2 are informed of the possibility that they exist in this elaborate 
demon world. What should they do epistemically? My view is that this possibility has basically no 
implications for the denizens of w2, despite the fact that they are systematically deceived and mislead. For 
discussion of such a case in favor of evidentialism and against reliabilism, see (Conee and Feldman 2004, 
83-100). For a defense of the sort of epistemological framework within which I stand, see (Jonathan 
Kvanvig 2014). For various theological applications of such an epistemological framework, see (i) “An 
Epistemological Corrective to Doctrines of Assurance,” (Rutledge 2017, 163-177) and (ii) “Commonsense, 
Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry Defeat” (Rutledge 2017, 17-32). 





I have argued that the doctrines of original sin and the Fall, contrary to initial 
appearances, have no implication that we should not trust our cognitive faculties. 
Indeed, I have argued that this is the case even if in fact the Fall has rendered our 
cognitive faculties completely and utterly unreliable when it comes to finding the truth. 
Of course, theologians and philosophers alike ought to recognize that a degree of 
fallibility resides within all of their intuitions, moral and otherwise, and surely it is 
unproblematic to admit this.21 Indeed, remembering that we continue to suffer from the 
effects of the fall (even post-conversion22) might give us a reason to pause and ensure 
that our intuitions concerning various matters are not being swayed by non-epistemic 
concerns. However, it is likewise important that admissions of fallibility not be pressed 
to the point that intuitions are wholly dismissed as irrelevant. Perhaps some scholar 
might wish to find sources within theology to motivate the complete dismissal of the 
intuitions of her colleague; however, as should be clear, the doctrine of the Fall and 
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